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Does framing change individual attitudes towards immigration? This thesis analyzes the effect of 
providing information about the unemployment- and employment rate of immigrants in Norway, 
as well as information about the impact the rates may have on the Norwegian welfare state. I expose 
some treatment groups to statistics of the rates, and others to information about how the rates may 
affect the Norwegian welfare state. I conduct a randomized survey experiment with more than 
1,000 respondents to investigate whether framing of the behavior (unemployed or employed) 
and/or the impact of this behavior (cost or benefit) changes views and attitudes towards 
immigration policy. These views and attitudes may reflect underlying beliefs and preferences, 
which again may be situation-dependent. The paper finds that the respondents internalize the 
framing, and that information about the employment rate of immigrants in Norway (60 percent) 
causes individuals to rate their preferences for immigration policy more strictly. This suggests that 
people react negatively to a seemingly low employment rate of immigrants. The results indicate 
that the experimental design activates certain beliefs and preferences for immigration, and that 
framing causes a short-term change in preferences for immigration policy. Since individual 
preferences are a determinant of policy outcome, and immigration policy is an important domain 
for political parties, my results implicate that providing negative information about the behavior of 
immigration right before an election, may affect the results of the election. More generally, various 
types of information may influence how people perceive immigration and are accordingly 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The international refugee crises has put pressure on the immigration policies of western European 
countries, spurring contested public debates that probably no, or few other, aspects of globalization 
has done before. At the same time, political parties and candidates who support restrictive 
immigration policies have gained widespread support, such as Front National in France, 
Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, and Donald Trump in The United States.  
During the latter part of 2015, Norway and many other western European countries experienced a 
heavy and continued influx of asylum seekers and refugees. Compared to other OECD countries, 
Norway had one of the highest immigration rates per capita, and in 2015, the applications for 
asylum were higher than ever before (NOU, 2017, p. 39). In the same year, more than sixty percent 
of Norwegians reported that they viewed immigration as one of the three main challenges Norway 
faces, in comparison to thirty-eight percent the year before (TNS Gallup, 2016).  
In light of this, it is necessary to understand the way people shape their attitudes towards 
immigration, as well as how different information affects attitudes. In other words, what determines 
individual preferences for immigration policy, and does different types of information affect these 
preferences? Individual preferences represent a main determinant of policy outcome (Rodrik, 
1995), and it is therefore important to understand the factors that decide these preferences, and how 
they are affected. Furthermore, preferences for immigration policies are based on beliefs about 
immigration, and scholars have found that these beliefs tend to be biased (Sides and Citrin, 2007a, 
2007b; Grigorieff et al., 2016). For instance, people consistently over-estimate the number of 
immigrants residing in their country (Grigorieff et al., 2016). Thus, it is interesting to test whether 
accurate information about immigration can affect preferences, and which type of information 
changes people’s attitudes. Does positive or negative framing (see Levin et al., 1998 for a review) 
of different types of information about immigration affect attitudes towards immigration?  
This thesis answers this question by experimentally testing whether providing positive and negative 
framing about immigration affects individual preferences for immigration policies. I conducted a 




groups to positive and negative framing. Of the three positive frames, (1) provides information that 
the employment rate of immigrants is 60 percent, (2) emphasizes the economic benefits of 
immigration and (3) is a combination. Of the three negative frames, (1) provides information that 
the unemployment rate of immigrants is 7 percent, (2) emphasizes the economic costs of 
immigration, and (3) is a combination. Initially, I intended the information about the employment 
rate to be a positive frame. However, people seem to react negatively to this information. This 
suggests that they interpret the information as a 40 percent unemployment rate, rather than a 60 
percent employment rate. The “positive” frame of the employment rate might therefore be an even 
more negative frame than the negative framing of the unemployment rate. I discuss this issue 
further in chapter 3.  
Moreover, the experimental design distinguishes between “behavioral information” (employed or 
unemployed) and “impact information” (benefit or cost) in the treatment groups. The experiment 
tests whether the views and attitudes of people who are exposed to positive and negative, behavioral 
and impact frames about immigration significantly differ from the views and attitudes of people 
who have not been exposed to such treatments.  
I use two dependent variables to measure these effects. The first captures respondents change in 
views by analyzing if they internalize the information. This variable measures changes in short-
term beliefs of immigration as a cost or a benefit to society. I find that respondents who receive 
information about the cost of immigration are more likely to state that immigration is a cost rather 
than a benefit. On the contrary, respondents who receive information about the benefit of 
immigration are not more likely to state that immigration is a benefit rather than a cost to society. 
People are most susceptible to negative impact information (cost of immigration), though this may 
be due to experimenter demand effects (Zizzo, 2010).  
The main dependent variable measures attitudes towards immigration through a policy preference 
question. I find that behavioral information about the employment rate of immigrants in Norway 
causes individuals to rate their preferences for immigration more strictly. I interpret the finding that 
people react negatively to this information (60 percent seems low), and thus rate their preferences 
for immigration more strictly. Moreover, in the heterogeneous analysis, I find that framing affects 




who view immigration as an important issue. In the analysis, I treat “views” as representing 
underlying beliefs, and “attitudes” as reflecting underlying preferences towards immigration.   
My results indicate that people are susceptible to negative framing, which is in line with previous 
research on framing effects (see Levin et al. 1998 for a review). A potential explanation is that 
“losses loom larger than gains,” or the notion of loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 
279). Further, the results also suggest a negativity bias, where social psychologists have found that 
people give greater weight to negative entities than to positive ones based on both inborn 
predispositions and experience (Kanouse & Hanson, 1972; Rozin & Royzman 2001). Other 
possible explanations are the fiscal burden hypothesis (Facchini & Mayda, 2009) or an anchoring 
effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1975). Lastly, the results also implicate that people may change their 
preferences in the very short run and sheds light on the importance information may have on 
affecting preferences. On the other hand, I may not have convincing enough positive treatments in 
the experiment and limitations in the design make it difficult to point at the exact underlying 
mechanisms of the results. 
Much of the empirical literature on immigration attitudes has focused on the determinants of 
individual attitudes towards immigration. While studies in the political economy tradition 
emphasize the role of economic determinants, such as labor market competition and fiscal burden 
considerations (Scheve & Slaughter 2001, Mayda, 2006), studies in the socio-psychological 
tradition show that cultural and psychological factors, such as group identity and culture, play a 
greater role in shaping attitudes (Citrin et al, 1997; Sniderman et al. 2004; Espenshade & 
Hempstead, 1996). I review the literature on both economic and socio-psychological determinants 
of attitudes. I further recognize that both economic and cultural considerations drive attitudes 
towards immigration, though my experiment focuses on the economic determinants.  
It is likely that certain features of the public debate activate different beliefs, and that these beliefs 
can affect policy preferences. While the economic literature explains the underlying determinants 
of immigrants, they say less about how immigration attitudes change. My thesis contributes to the 
immigration literature by researching if information about the economic implications of 
immigration can affect preferences. It further contributes to the existing literature on the 
determinants of immigration attitudes, by using framing to affect preferences through economic 




(Latino or Western-European), and the framing thus works through the predisposing factors that 
are socio-psychological, such as culture, group identity and fear (Sniderman et al 2004; Brader et 
al. 2008). To the best of my knowledge, fewer studies have employed framing techniques that 
activate the economic determinants of attitudes. Sniderman et al. (2004) emphasize the role of 
“situational triggers,” in addition to predisposing factors, in explaining how people shape their 
attitudes towards immigration. As such, this experiment uses framing as a “situational trigger” in 
an attempt to affect immigration attitudes. The framing does not emphasize who the immigrants 
are, but what they do (employed or unemployed) and how this affects the society (cost or benefit). 
This thesis is closest in spirit to two recent studies, Grigorieff et al. (2016) and Facchini et al. 
(2016). The former study experimentally tests if correcting biased beliefs about immigration, such 
as the number of immigrants residing in the country, changes immigration attitudes. They find that 
people who are told the actual percentage of immigrants in their country are less likely to say that 
there are too many immigrants, but they do not find an effect on the respondents’ self-reported 
immigration policy variable. Their results imply that people may update their underlying beliefs 
about immigration but not their preferences.  Facchini et al. (2016) investigate whether proving 
information about the potential social and economic benefits of immigration can change 
immigration attitudes in Japan. They find that positive interventions emphasizing the benefits of 
immigration led to increased support for a less restrictionist immigration policy. My experiment 
differs from these studies in that I provide both negative and positive information about behavior 
and impact in an attempt to isolate which type of information affects attitudes. This thesis aims to 
answer the following research question: Does framing affect individual attitudes towards 
immigration? 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief background to immigration 
in Norway, a review of related literature on the determinants of individual attitudes towards 
immigration, as well as a theoretical framework of framing effects. Chapter 3 presents the 
experimental research design and describes the data. Chapter 4 highlights the results, chapter 5 





Chapter 2: Background, theory, and related literature 
 
As immigrant populations have grown and changed the demographics of many European countries, 
an extensive literature on natives’ attitudes toward immigration has also rapidly developed. This 
chapter provides a brief background to immigration in the Norwegian context. It then reviews the 
literature on the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. I distinguish between 
political-economic and socio-psychological determinants, and I include a discussion on altruism 
and reciprocity. The section further discusses how “non-economic” factors can explain attitudes 
towards immigration by incorporating identity into a model of consumer behavior (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000). Lastly, the chapter reviews the literature on framing theory. Based on this 
theoretical framework, the thesis aims to answer if framing affects individual attitudes towards 
immigration through an experimental approach.  
2.1 Background 
The Norwegian welfare model faces challenges of an older population and uncertainties regarding 
the future return of the oil fund. The higher immigration of people whose means to support 
themselves remain low, adds to the pressure on public finances and the welfare model. According 
to the newest NOU report on the long run effects of immigration, Norway has not properly 
succeeded in integrating immigrants from outside Europe into the labor market. The report stresses 
that if Norway does not achieve this, there is a risk that the increasing economic inequality together 
with cultural differences may weaken the foundation of coherence and trust in society, which can 
ultimately undermine the legitimacy of the welfare model (NOU:2, p.11).  
Historically, global and regional differences in welfare and income, as well as the demand for work, 
have been two of the major driving forces behind international migration (Borjas, 1999a, 1999b) 
Today, people migrate to seek work, education, better living conditions, to live near close family, 
or because they are fleeing persecution, oppression, conflicts, environmental destructions and 
natural disasters. In the past decades, conflict, oppression and persecution have become larger 
driving forces behind migration.  
As seen in figure 1, immigration to Norway has steadily increased over the past twenty years. The 




increasing trend of immigration to Norway between 1990 and 2015. In 2011-2012 the total 
immigration to Norway reached a peak, with around 58 000 per year (Statistics Norway, 2017). 
Net migration1, was 48 000 in 2012. Since the peak in 2012, immigration to Norway has decreased. 
Figure 1: Immigrants, by reason for immigration 
 
Source: Statistics Norway (2016) 
While the Norwegian welfare model contributes to high social mobility of the second generation 
of immigrants, the model is very vulnerable to immigration of adults with low qualifications (NOU 
2017:2).  
2.2 What determines individual attitudes toward immigration? 
The question of what determines individual attitudes towards immigration is important for 
understanding individual preferences, policy outcomes, how immigrants are integrated, and not 
least the welfare state’s provision of services to immigrants. This section introduces the reader to 
two schools of thought on the topic of determinants: political economy determinants, and socio-
psychological determinants.  
 
                                                          




In their review of public attitudes towards immigration, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) divide 
the literature on determinants of immigration attitudes into research grounded in the political 
economy tradition and in the political psychology tradition. Others have referred to the 
determinants as ‘economic’ and ‘non-economic’ factors (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda 
2006; O’Rourke & Sinnot 2006). In this section, I use the categorization by Hainmueller and 
Hokins (2014), and I include a discussion on altruism and reciprocity.     
While the political-economic research maintains that economic factors, such labor market 
competition, explain individual attitudes, the socio-psychological research holds that the ‘non-
economic’ factors, such as group identity and culture, play a major role in shaping attitudes. This 
paper recognizes that both factors are central in explaining determinants of individual attitudes 
towards immigration, although my thesis focuses on the economic determinants.   
Political economy determinants 
According to Borjas (1999a), fears about labor market competition and/or the fiscal burden of 
immigrants are the two most pressing issues in the immigration debate. These two issues have also 
come to gain widespread attention in recent studies explaining attitudes towards immigration 
(Scheve & Slaughter, 2007; Mayda 2006; O’Rourke & Sinnot 2006; Facchini & Mayda, 2009).   
The political economy approach is based on the idea that attitudes are related to self-interest. The 
approach uses the competition of resources between immigrants and natives as the theoretical 
framework. Models of factors proportion and labor market competition are used to explain how 
individual attitudes are formed. Although the main argument is rooted in the political economy 
tradition, the studies also recognize the role of socio-psychological determinants.  
Labor market competition 
Several studies test the effect of labor market competition on immigration attitudes based on the 
theoretical framework of international trade theory (Heckscher Ohlin model) and the “factor-
proportions” (FP) analysis (Borjas 1999b). Commonly starting with a model where citizens are 
endowed with different factors of production and income levels, these studies analyze how the 
influx of high skilled versus low skilled labor affect immigration attitudes. They start with a simple 
closed-economy model where one assumes that immigrants have relatively low skill-levels 




skilled workers compared to other factors such as high skilled workers, land and capital. This leads 
to more competition in the market for low-skilled labor, pushing down real wages for low-skilled 
native workers and increasing wages for native citizens with high skills, land and capital. If 
immigrants were high skilled, the effect would be lower real wages in the market for high skilled 
workers and higher real wages for all others. The FP analysis predicts a correlation between 
immigration attitudes and skill level, which relates to the relative skill composition between 
immigrants and natives. Thus, the theory posits that citizens in countries with a relative 
composition of high skills should favor low-skilled immigration and vice versa.  
A cornerstone study is Scheve and Slaughter (2001), which uses the FP analysis to show that low-
skilled workers are more likely to hold restrictionist immigration views.  They measure low skilled 
labor by years of education and wages. Although their findings are consistent with the FP model, 
the authors also acknowledge the role of other explanatory factors (such as cultural considerations).  
Building on the findings by Scheve and Slaughter (2001), O’Rourke and Sinnot (2006) expand the 
analysis to include data for 24 countries on sociodemographic characteristics, socioeconomic 
position and political attitudes to test whether attitudes vary with individuals’ endowments. They 
conclude that “the high-skilled are less opposed to immigration than the low-skilled, and this effect 
is greater in richer countries than in poorer countries and in more equal countries than in more 
unequal ones” (p, 857). They interpret these findings as further support for the FP analysis. Lastly, 
their results suggest that immigration attitudes reflect nationalist sentiment, though these results 
are less robust due to the potential of a reverse causality problem (national policy preferences 
explain attitudes towards immigration). Finally, they find that the determinants of attitudes towards 
refugees are different from the determinants of attitudes towards immigration.   
Lastly, another widely cited paper, Mayda (2006) also finds support for the FP analysis, using the 
same data as O’Rourke and Sinnot (2006). She expands the analysis to include correlation patterns 
between individual answers to questions on immigration attitudes and socio-psychological issues. 
After controlling for non-economic factors, she finds that there is still support for the FP 
hypotheses. She concludes that both non-economic and economic factors play a role in determining 
attitudes towards immigration, and that skill composition across countries affect individual 





Self-interest can shape attitudes towards immigration through labor market competition, but also 
through fiscal impact. This analysis is based on models in public finance, which show that low-
skilled immigration raises fiscal pressures, either resulting in lower government spending (benefits) 
or higher taxes (see Hanson et al. 2007; Facchini & Mayda, 2009). These models assume that low-
skilled immigration is a net burden to public finances, and that natives anticipate the effect on taxes 
and benefits. Low-skilled immigration thus affects natives’ contributions to the welfare state as 
well as the benefits they potentially receive from it, which in turn determines attitudes towards 
immigration.  
Tax adjustment models posit that the government adjusts the welfare costs (taxes) following 
immigration, leaving per capita benefits unchanged. Since natives with higher incomes will bear 
most of the cost of immigration through taxation, the theory predicts that high-skilled natives 
workers should be more opposed than low-skilled natives to low-skilled immigration. Benefit 
adjustment models hypothesize that the government adjusts per capita benefits, leaving taxes 
unchanged. Thus, natives at the bottom of the income distribution, who are more likely to receive 
benefits, suffer losses and are more likely to oppose immigration (see Faccchini & Mayda, 2009 
for a full framework of the models). 
Hanson et al. (2007) investigate whether potential high fiscal costs from immigration shape policy 
preferences. They find that, in The United States, high-skilled natives (estimated by education 
levels) have stricter policy views in states where the net fiscal burden of immigration is likely to 
be high. They find support for the fiscal burden theory, and conclude, “high exposure to immigrant 
fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among natives, especially the more skilled” 
(p. 30).  
Similarly, Facchini and Mayda (2009) find that natives with high income are more negatively 
affected by low-skilled immigration because they bear most of the fiscal costs. They show the 
effect of low-skilled immigration on attitudes through a tax adjustment model, where taxes are 
raised to maintain per capita transfers unchanged, and a benefit adjustment model, where the 




where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual income is negatively 
correlated with pro-immigration preferences” (Facchini & Mayda, 2009, p. 296).    
 
On the other hand, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find that both rich and poor natives oppose low-
skilled immigration. They conclude that their findings are inconsistent with hypotheses of self-
interest, and that the results instead “are consistent with alternative arguments emphasizing 
noneconomic concerns associated with ethnocentrism” (p.61).  
Altruism and reciprocity 
It is likely that questions of morality and ethics are important aspects of determinants of 
preferences, and the thesis therefore includes a discussion on altruism and reciprocity as potential 
determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration. 
Altruism, or the idea that people behave selflessly, opposes the economic assumption that self-
interest motivates behavior. The philosopher Thomas Nagel defines altruism in the following way: 
“By altruism I mean not abject self-sacrifice, but merely a willingness to act in the consideration 
of the interests of other persons, without the need of ulterior motives” (Nagel, 1970, p. 79). 
According to this definition, altruism is purely motivated by the concern for the interests of others. 
More formally, an individual’ utility, increases with the well-being of others (Fehr and Schmidt, 
2006). On the other hand, others have discussed the impurity of altruism, arguing that individuals 
derive utility by giving to others – the ‘warm-glowing’ of giving – and posits that this behavior is 
motivated by self-interest (Andreoni, 1995). According to him, pure altruism and the warm glowing 
effect may work either separately or complementarily.  
To identify altruistic behavior, experimental research eliminates the potential of selfish actions 
based on ulterior motives. There is a wide range of laboratory experiments using prisoner’s 
dilemma, dictator, public good, as well as trust games to show that people have altruistic and/or 
warm-glowing motives.2  
                                                          
2 For further reading, see Kelley and Stanelski (1970), Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) for prisoner dilemma games, 
Ledyard (1994) for a summary of public good games, Guth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982) for dictator games, 






There are different views on altruism and on how it affects behavior. “Conditional altruism” is one 
particular form of altruism that might be of particular relevance in explaining attitudes towards 
immigration. For example, a conditional altruist would hold that, “if immigrants work hard and 
contribute to the Norwegian welfare state, I am willing to accept milder immigration policies.” 
This relates to the idea of reciprocity, meaning that “in response to friendly actions, people are 
frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model; 
conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal” 
(Fehr & Gächter, 2000, p. 159). For instance, in distributive situations, people are more willing to 
give aid to a recipient the less they perceive him/her as responsible for their misfortune (Konow, 
2000; List & Cherry, 2008). 
Reciprocity may also affect social policy issues (Bowles & Gintis, 1998). According to this view, 
social policies are much more likely to be accepted by public opinion if they depend on rewarding 
people who contribute to society rather than on those who do not contribute. In the literature, there 
is growing consensus that people are more willing to punish those who do not contribute than to 
reward those who do contribute (Fehr & Gächter, 2000).  
Socio-psychological determinants 
The socio-psychological approach highlights the effect of group identity, symbols, norms, 
stereotyping, and group categorization in explaining attitudes. Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014) 
notes that the effects can be thought of as both cultural and economic.  
The ‘non-economic’, or socio-psychological factors can affect attitudes in different ways. For 
instance, people may perceive immigration as a threat to the norms and national identity of a 
society. These individuals may derive utility from living in a country with a strong sense of national 
identity and norms, and therefore oppose immigration.  
Identity – a person’s sense of self – is a central concept within the field of social psychology, 
political science, anthropology, sociology and history (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Tajfel and 
Turner’s social identity theory posits that individuals sort people into “in-groups” and “out-




their own in-group and discriminate against the out-group. This concept, also referred to as 
ethnocentrism, has been widely used to explain immigration attitudes (Sniderman et al. 2000; 
Kinder & Cindy, 2000).  
Several studies have looked at the effect of socio-psychological factors on immigration attitudes, 
while also leaving the potential role for political economy factors (Espenshade & Calhoun, 1993; 
Espenshade & Hempstead, 1996; Citrin et al. 1997; Sniderman et al. 2004; Dustmann & Preston, 
2007). These studies conclude that non-economic factors reign over economic factors in explaining 
individual attitudes towards immigration.  
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) were notably the first to incorporate the concept of identity into an 
economic model of behavior to demonstrate how identity influences economic outcomes. In fact, 
they argue that because individuals choose who they want to be, and, because identity is 
fundamental to behavior, this choice of identity may be the most important ‘economic decision’ 
people make (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 717). They explore the idea that, “Identity can account 
for many phenomena that current economics cannot well explain” (p. 716). These phenomena 
include ethnic and racial conflict, discrimination, labor disputes and separatist politics.  
According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), the concept of identity contributes to economic analysis 
in many ways. For instance, identity can give rise to a new type of externality where the identity 
of one individual may threaten the identity of another individual (the identity of a foreign woman 
may threaten the identity of a native woman). Identity provides an alternative way to changing 
preferences.  
The authors propose a utility function where identity serves as a motivation for behavior (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000, 718). In the utility function, identity is related to social categories and expected 
respective behaviors (a norm or a prescription for behavior). Deviation from the norms, or 
prescriptions as they term them, causes disutility. Each person has a conception of his own and 
others’ categories. 
Lastly, several studies have linked the concept of identity to redistributive preferences in welfare 
economics (Shayo, 2009; Font & Cowell, 2013). Font & Cowell (2013) conclude, “the extent to 




As mentioned previously, one might expect that immigration attitudes correlate with redistributive 
preferences. 
Discussion 
After reviewing more than one hundred studies on immigration attitudes, Hainmueller and Hopkins 
(2014) conclude that natives’ attitudes towards immigration show more sign of being shaped by 
socio-psychological concerns about its cultural impacts on a nation, than on the economic impacts. 
On the other hand, the aforementioned political economy studies conclude that economic factors 
play just as great a role in shaping attitudes.  
There are, however, a number of economic theories, such as identity economics (Akerlof & 
Kranton, 2000), economics of reciprocity (Fehr & Gachter, 2000) and several experiments (see 
footnote in altruism discussion for examples) that have analyzed how ‘non-economic’ factors affect 
beliefs and social preferences. Although preferences are exogenously given in classical economic 
theory, much behavioral research in economics is devoted to the analysis on how ‘non-economic’ 
factors may change preferences.  
2.3 Framing theory 
Neoclassical economic theory makes the assumptions that (i) agents have defined preferences and 
unbiased expectations and beliefs, (ii) they make optimal decisions based on these expectations 
and beliefs, and (iii) their primary motivation is self-interest. Standard preference theory assumes 
that preferences are “reference independent,” meaning that they are not affected by the asset 
position of the individual. Further, it assumes invariance, meaning that different frames of the same 
choice problem should yield the same preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986). Much behavioral 
research, however, indicates a violation of these assumptions. 
One of these violations include the power of framing, which has gained widespread attention in 
behavioral research.  The way we word choices to highlight negative and positive sides of the same 
decision has been found to affect individual decision-making, attitudes, and actions. As such, 
“framing effects show that the way that choices are presented to an individual often determine the 
preferences that are ‘revealed’ ” (Camerer et al., 2004, p. 12). Closely related are other behavioral 
anomalies, such as the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), observed divergences 




the anchoring effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1975), and the endowment effect (Thaler, 1980). 
These are all examples of reference-dependent decision-making, where values are attached to 
changes relative to a reference point, rather than to final states or absolute levels (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979:277). Lastly, these anomalies broadly relate to the concept of loss aversion, a 
phenomenon encountered in Kahneman & Tversky’s prospect theory. 
In this section, I will introduce three different types of framing: (1) risky choice framing, (2) 
attribute framing, and (3) goal framing, following the typology by Levin and colleagues (1998). 
My experimental design is motivated by attribute and goal framing. I start with a discussion of 
prospect theory, where the authors used risky choice framing to show that people avert risk in a 
positive frame and support risk in a negative frame (loss aversion). Although studies have shown 
that loss aversion occurs in the presence of risk, the phenomenon is not necessarily dependent on 
decision-making models with risk (Levin et al, 1998 p. 177). I propose that loss aversion can partly 
explain why the negative frames in my experimental design affect views and attitudes.  
Prospect theory 
Loss aversion is hardly a new phenomenon. Already 200 years before Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) prospect theory, Adam Smith (1759) visited the idea that people are much more sensitive 
to losses than to gains, contrary to neoclassical economic prediction. In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, he wrote, “We suffer more, it has already been observed, when we fall from a better 
to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better” (Smith, 1759, p. 
214). Although Smith’s quote may refer to the fall and rise in social statuses, the intuitions remains 
the same: we are likely to suffer more from losses than we are to enjoy our gains, or, put differently, 
we are likely to demand more to give up something we own than we are willing to pay for the same 
good. 
In prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) theorized that presenting options in negative 
and positive frames would affect the outcome of a decision under risk. They found that under 
positive prospects, people tend to be risk averse, and under negative prospects, they tend to be risk 
seeking. By highlighting the discrepancies between consumer behavior and utility theory through 
responses in questionnaires, Kahneman and Tversky concluded that consumers treat gains 




Based on their findings, they formulated a value function, v, which is defined in terms of changes 
in wealth instead of final asset position and may replace the utility function. In expected utility 
theory, a subject will value a prospect in accordance with probabilities, whereas in prospect theory 
subjective decision weights replace the probabilities. The value function is therefore defined with 
respect to a reference point, rather than a final position. It is concave for gains and convex for 
losses, and it is also steeper for losses (see figure below).  
 
Figure 2: The value function 
 
 
The classical example of risky framing is the “Asian disease” problem, where people are informed 
about a disease that threatens the lives of 600 people and asked to choose between a positive (lives 
saved) frame and a negative (lives lost) frame (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). In the positive frame, 
respondents can choose between (A) saving 200 lives for sure, and (B) one third chance of saving 
600 people with a two-third chance of saving no one. In the negative frame, they choose either (C) 
400 people dying for sure or (D) a two-third chance that 600 people die and a one-third chance that 
no one dies. The majority of people choose options (A) in the positive frame (risk averse), and 
option (D) in the negative frame (risk seeking), even though A and C and B and D are equivalent 
in terms of lives saved and lost.    
According to Levin and colleagues (1998), “Choice can only provide an indirect measure of the 
effect of a frame on information processing because choice relies on several component processes 




another aspect – risk – it is harder to identify if it is the frame or the risk that affects the information 
processing. Levin et al. (1998) have identified two more types of framing: attribute framing and 
goal framing. 
Attribute and goal framing 
Attribute framing is the simplest form of framing, where the emphasis lies on a single attribute of 
an object or an event in a negative or in a positive frame. Subjects receive information about a 
success rate and a failure rate before they are asked to evaluate an event or an object. According to 
Levin et al (1998), attribute framing allows for the most basic test of the influence of a positive and 
a negative frame because of the absence of risk. Figure 3 illustrates how attribute framing uses a 
positive frame to accentuate a success rate, and a negative frame to accentuate a failure rate. 
 
Figure 3: Attribute framing  
      
 
  
Source: Replication from Levin et al (1998, p 158). 
 
For example, Levin & Gaeth (1988) showed that perceptions of beef changed when they labeled it 
“75% lean” vs “25 % fat.” When labeled in the positive frame (75% lean), beef was rated less 
greasy and even better tasting. They suggested that the framing effect occurred because positive 
and negative labeling of attributes are likely to cause negative and positive associations in memory. 
The framing effect produces a “valence-consistent shift” where the positive frame leads to more 
favorable evaluations than the negative frame (See Levin et al., 1998 for a further discussion on 
the cognitive processes behind framing effects). Thus, describing an object or event in terms of a 
success rate is more likely to yield a favorable evaluation than describing it in terms of a failure 




















of medical treatments, as well as in evaluations of projects and programs (Levin & Gaeth, 1988; 
Marteau, 1989; Dunegan, 1993). 
 
Goal framing refers to the framing of the consequence or goal of a behavior, and is a more 
complicated form of framing. Goal framing tests whether the persuasiveness of a positive or 
negative frame will have the greatest impact on respondents. According to Levin et al. (2002), 
“goal-framing effects occur when a persuasive message has different appeal depending on whether 
it stresses the positive consequences of performing an act to achieve a particular goal or the 
negative consequences of not performing the act” (p.6). Figure 4 shows how the positive frame 
focuses on the gains of a behavior, whereas the negative frame focuses on the losses of not 
performing a behavior.  
 






Source: Replication from Levin et al (1998, p 173). 
 
Effects of goal framing have been widely documented in health-related studies (Meyerowitz & 
Chaiken, 1987; Banks et al. 1995), For example, Banks et al. (1995) found that women who 
received negative goal framing about mammography were more likely to obtain a mammogram in 
the next year. In their experiment, they measured attitudes and beliefs before and after the 
respondents had viewed videos that highlighted either the risks of not obtaining a mammogram 
(negative goal frame), or the benefits of obtaining a mammogram (positive goal frame).  
OBTAIN GAIN
SUFFER LOSS
RATE OF BEH X 
RATE OF BEH X 









The effect is also identified in studies of “endowment effects” (Thaler, 1980) and “social 
dilemmas” (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Andreoni, 1995; Ellingsen et al., 2012). For instance, 
Thaler (1980) found that people were more willing to forego a cash discount than to accept a credit 
card surcharge. Again, the implied negative goal frame (credit card surcharge) had a greater effect 
than the positive goal frame (cash discount).  Studies of the endowment effect show that people are 
more willing to forego gains than to accept losses, relating it closely to the concept of loss aversion. 
In studies of social dilemmas, many laboratory experiments indicate that different game labels can 
affect cooperation in the games (Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Andreoni, 1995; Ellingsen et al., 2012). 
For instance, among others, Ellingsen et al., (2012) found that people are more likely to be 
cooperative in a Prisoner’s dilemma experiment named the “Community game” than the “Stock 
market game.” In terms of goal framing, the label “Community game” infers a goal of cooperation 
at the cost of potential private gains (loss or negative frame), whereas the label “Stock market 
game” gives a cue that it is a competitive game with possible private gains (gain or positive frame).  
According to Levin et al., (1998), there are more variations in using goal-framing effects than 
attribute framing, and the evidence is therefore more heterogeneous. For goal framing effects, 
Levin et al, 1998 conclude “the impact of negative information, with or without risk, has routinely 
been found to be stronger than the impact of positive information of the same magnitude.” (p. 177).  
My experimental design resonates well with (and is highly motivated by) the categorization by 
Levin et al., (1998). However, this thesis uses the terms behavioral information and impact 
information to describe the frames in my experiment, as these descriptions are more coherent with 
my experimental design. Information about the unemployment- and employment rate says more 
about the behavior of people than the attributes of an object, and I have therefore chosen to call it 
behavioral information instead of attribute framing. Further, information about the costs of 
unemployment and the benefits of employment frames a goal/consequence, but it does not frame 
the goal/consequence of the same act (for instance see mammography example). Instead, this 
experiment uses two different acts (work/not work) to describe two different consequences 




Framing in immigration studies 
When framing topics of immigration, several studies have focused on group framing labels such 
as “illegal aliens” vs “undocumented workers,” and “Latino” vs “European.” (Brader et al., 2008; 
Knoll et al., 2011). These studies find that ethnic cues and negative group labeling are likely to 
produce anxiety and strengthen in-group mentality (thus working through the socio-psychological 
determinants). For instance, Brader et al. (2008) uses framing manipulations that (1) emphasize the 
cost or benefit of immigration, (2) label immigrants as “Latinos” or “European”, and (3) label them 
as “high-skilled” or “low-skilled” labor. They report that the ethnic labeling frames (Latino vs 
European) create the greatest change in immigration policy preferences, and conclude that ethnic 
cues are more likely to affect attitudes towards immigration than economic costs or skill levels.  
Similarly, in a nationally representative telephone survey, Sniderman et al. (2004) tests whether 
the framing of cultural vs economic “threats” affect attitudes. They find that cultural threatening 
cues (immigrants in the Netherlands who do not speak Dutch) evoke more opposition to 
immigration than economic cues. Alternatively, others have found that cognitive processes, such 
as framing, can work through providing stereotype-consistent stories (Valentino et al. 2002). As 
such, “Latino” frame or “cultural threatening” cues may also activate negative stereotypes of 
“illegal aliens” and low-skilled workers, thus strengthening the effect of a “Latino” or “cultural” 
frame. 
Closest to my study in experimental design, Facchini et al. (2016) finds that providing information 
about the social and economic benefits of immigration led to increased support for less restrictionist 
immigration policy. Many of their effects also persisted 10-12 days after the treatments. My 
experiment, on the other hand, finds no support for an effect of the positive frames. However, 
different from my experimental design, Facchini et al. (2016) provide extensive information about 
the specific benefits of immigration to the welfare state. For instance, they highlight that 
immigration can combat the current pension crisis in Japan, and find that this results in a 21 
percentage point increase in support for a less restrictionist immigration policy. In contrast, my 
design only highlights that immigration is an income to the welfare state, and does not mention 




It is difficult to identify what truly determines individual attitudes towards immigration, as well as 
how to identify which and why framing manipulations work. Based on the theoretical framework 
and related literature discussed in this chapter, the thesis aims to investigate whether framing in the 
treatment groups activates underlying beliefs and preferences for immigration policy.  
2.4 Research question 
The thesis aims to answer the following overall research question:  
 Does framing affect individual attitudes towards immigration? 
The experimental design is motivated by the literature on both the political economy and socio-
psychological determinants of attitudes towards immigration, as well as by the framing literature. 
My experimental design is influenced by the fiscal burden hypothesis: providing negative and 
positive information on the impact of immigration on the Norwegian welfare state will affect 
individual attitudes towards immigration through the discussed mechanisms of these models.  
Furthermore, the design is also influenced by the literature on conditional altruism and reciprocity: 
Positive (negative) framing about the contribution (non-contribution) of immigrants (work/not 
work) may affect attitudes through the mechanism of responding to behaviour as discussed in 
chapter 2.  
Hypotheses 
𝑯𝑯𝟏𝟏: It is more likely to find statistical significance for the negative framing than it is to find 
statistical significance for the positive framing. 
 As previously discussed, loss aversion and a negativity bias can partly explain how the 
negative information may affect the respondents more than the positive information. This 
hypothesis is also consistent with the extensive review on framing effects by Levin et al. (1998), 
who show that most studies on goal framing, which is closely related to the impact information, 
find that negative goal framing has the greatest impact on respondents.  
Furthermore, research in political science has found that framing stereotype-consistent stories may 




between the treatments that focus on unemployment and costs to society, since these are negative 
and stereotypical depictions of immigrant populations.  
𝑯𝑯𝟐𝟐: It is more likely to find statistical significance for the negative impact framing than it is to find 
statistical significance for the negative behavioral framing. 
 This hypothesis follows the fiscal burden hypothesis: providing information about the 
cost of immigration reinforces the mechanisms of the tax adjustment and benefit adjustment models 
– because of additional taxes or fewer benefits, people will respond to the frame. The negative 
impact frame (unemployment is a cost to society) states directly how immigration is a cost to 
society, whereas the behavioral information states indirectly (through the unemployment rate) that 
it is a cost to society. I therefore hypothesize that negative impact framing reinforces the fiscal 
burden theory.  
Alternatively, theories of conditional altruism and reciprocity support the idea that behavioral 
information (work/not work) will have statistical significance. A conditional altruist shapes beliefs 
and preferences about immigration on what immigrants do (work or not work). Accordingly, their 
preferences for immigration policies depend on the behavior of the immigrants. Thus, these 
theories predict that the behavioral information will have statistical significance and not impact 
information. 
𝑯𝑯𝟑𝟑: It is more likely to find statistical significance for the treatment that combines negative 
behavioral and negative impact information than to find statistical significance for the treatment 
that combines positive behavioral and positive impact information. 
 The combined treatments analyze whether the combined effect is greater than the sum 
of their individual effects. I expect that these combined treatments place more emphasis on the 
negative features of immigration, and that this emphasis will make the frame more effective. 





Chapter 3: Research design and data 
 
3.1 Design 
I have chosen an experimental approach because it resolves the problem of selection bias present 
in studies using observational data. With experimental data, I assure that subjects are randomly 
assigned to the different groups in my design, and an orthogonality test shows that the samples are 
in fact balanced. It further makes it possible to identify key aspects that might influence beliefs and 
preferences, as well as how these vary across the different groups. With an experimental design, 
the interventions are exogenous, allowing the experimenter full control over the explanatory 
variables. This also solves endogeneity problems.  
I conducted the experiment in the Norwegian Citizen Panel at the University of Bergen.3 The 
Norwegian Citizen panel is a web-based survey that gathers data on Norwegians’ attitudes and 
opinions towards societal matters. The panel sends out the survey a few times a year and the 
respondents are randomly selected from the National Registry. The respondents thus represent a 
cross-section of the Norwegian population. The survey takes on average 20 minutes to complete. 
My experiment is part of the data collected in wave 7. We sent out the web-based survey in 
September 2016, and we retrieved the data in December 2016.  
In my experiment, 1,087 respondents were randomized into six treatment groups and one control 
group. The treatment groups received negative and positive behavioral and impact infomation, 
whereas the control group received no framing prior to questions on belief update and immigration 
policy preference.  
3.2 Treatment groups  
The experiment exposes three treatment groups to negative framing about the unemployment rate 
of immigrants in Norway, and three treatment groups to positive framing about the employment 
rate of immigrants in Norway. Thus, the framing emphasizing unemployment (three groups) is 
                                                          
3 Norwegian Citizen Panel round 7, 2016. Data gathered by Ideas2Evidence for Elisabeth Ivarsflaten et.al., 




characterized as ‘negative framing,’ and the framing about the employment rate (three groups) as 
‘positive framing.’  
The experimental design further distinguishes between behavioral and impact information. The 
behavioral treatments receive statistical information about the unemployment and employment 
rates, and the impact treatments receive information about the effect the rates may have on the 
Norwegian welfare state in terms of a cost or a benefit. Lastly, two treatment groups combine the 
positive behavioral and impact framing, and the negative behavioral and impact framing. The 
control group receives no framing.  
All groups receive two questions: (1) to test whether they have internalized the framing and 
changed their views, and (2) a policy question to analyze the effect of framing on immigration 
attitudes. 
Table 1 shows an overview of the six treatment groups. The respondents in the two behavioral 
treatments, Unemployment and Employment, are informed about the statistics of the 
unemployment/employment rate of immigrants in Norway. The two impact treatments, Expense 
and Income, are informed about the impact of the unemployment/employment rate of immigrants 
on the Norwegian welfare state. Lastly, Unemployment+Expense and Employment+Income, 

























You may well be aware 
that the unemployment rate 
for immigrants in Norway 
is around 7 %. 
Expense 
 
You may well be aware 
that the unemployment rate 
for immigrants means a 
significant expense for the 




You may well be aware that 
the unemployment rate for 
immigrants in Norway is 
around 7 %. This means a 
significant expense for the 







You may well be aware 
that the employment rate 
for immigrants in Norway 
is around 60 %.6 
Income 
 
You may well be aware 
that the employment rate 
for immigrants means a 
significant income for the 
Norwegian welfare state. 
Employment+Income 
 
You may well be aware that 
the employment rate for 
immigrants in Norway is 
around 60 %. This means a 
significant income for the 
Norwegian welfare state. 
 
 
                                                          
4 Unemployed persons are persons who were not employed in the reference week, but who had been seeking work 
during the preceding four weeks, and were available for work in the reference week or within the next two weeks (in 
1996-2005 one should be available within two weeks following the time of interview, and until 1996 one should be 
able to start working in the reference week). Persons laid off 100 per cent are defined as unemployed after three 
continuous months of leave. (Statistics Norway, 2017, http://www.ssb.no/en/akumnd)  
5 Employed persons are persons aged 15-74 who performed work for pay or profit for at least one hour in the reference 
week, or who were temporarily absent from work because of illness, holidays etc. Conscripts are classified as employed 
persons. Persons engaged by government measures to promote employment are also included if they receive wages. 
Persons laid off 100 per cent with a continuous duration of until three months are defined as employed, temporarily 
absent” (Ibid) 





Because the employment rate includes people aged 15-74 years in Norway, it tends to be lower 
than what people imagine. In comparison, the Norwegian employment rate was 68 percent when I 
conducted the experiment. The term “employment rate” is not usually encountered in the public 
debate.  Ideally, the employment rate would be 93 % and I would have a “perfect” attribute frame. 
Unfortunately, there is no such symmetry in this experimental design. In accordance with framing 
theory, the two behavioral frames show a “success rate” (employed) and a “failure rate” 
(unemployed). However, it appears that people view a 60 percent employment rate as a 40 percent 
unemployment rate, which is a misreading of the intended design. It appears that the intended 
positive behavioral framing is in fact even more negative than the negative behavioral frame of 
unemployment. I will therefore treat it as another negative frame. Due to this, I also expect that 
the combined treatment of employment and income have two effects working against each other 
(60 percent deemed low but the framing emphasizes income). These are weaknesses of the design, 
which I discuss at the end of chapter 4.  
3.3 Dependent variables 
After the framing, the respondents in all groups (both control and treatments) are asked to answer 
two questions: one to tests if respondents update their beliefs about immigration as a cost or a 
benefit to society, and one that measures if respondents rate their preferences for immigration 
policy differently.  
I include these two dependent variable to capture two different effects: the first dependent variable 
captures whether the respondents have internalized the framing and if they have understood the 
information I provide. Further, it captures an important aspect of the experiment: the view on the 
societal cost/benefit of immigration. In that regard, it does not capture attitudes towards 
immigration, but it does test whether respondents update their beliefs about immigration after the 
positive and negative framing. The question reads as follows:  





The respondents are asked to scale their preferences between 1 and 7, where 1 = great cost, 2 = 
cost, 3 = certain cost, 4 = neither cost nor benefit, 5 = certain benefit, 6 = benefit, 7 = great benefit.  
Although this question tests whether the respondents successfully internalize the priming, it cannot 
serve as a main outcome variable in the experiment due to the likelihood of experimenter demand 
effects (Zizzo, 2010). 
The main dependent variable is view on immigration policy and captures whether framing changes 
respondents attitudes towards immigration. I measure the framing effect through a self-reported 
policy preference variable: 
2. “How mild or strict should Norway’s immigration policy be?” 
Respondents rate their preferences on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = very mild, 2 = mild, 3 = 
somewhat mild, 4 = neither mild nor strict, 5 = somewhat strict, 6 = strict, 7 = very strict. This is 
the main dependent variable in the experiment.  
3.4 Main variables 
As specified in table 2, I include a number of different control variables in the analysis. These 
control variables include gender and age of respondents, education level, income, region of 
residence, and size of municipality. I use three dummy variables for age between 18-29, 30-59, 
60+, with 60+ the excluded category in the regression analysis. I measure education by three 
dummy variables for primary/no education, secondary and tertiary education, with primary/no 
education the excluded category. Further, I use dummies to capture each of the 19 regions, where 
Oslo is the excluded category. The income variable contains data from a previous wave7, and is 
limited to half the sample. Lastly, the size of the municipality is captured by three dummies for 




                                                          









View on immigration policiy Variable based on response to question "How mild or strict should 
Norway's immigration politics be?" (scale from 0-1, where 0 = Mild, 1 = 
View on cost of immigration Variable based on response to question "How large would you say the 
cost or benefit of immigration is to the Norwegian welfare state?" ,  (scale 
from 0-1, where 0 = Great benefit, 1 = Great cost). 
Treatment variables
Unemployment rate Dummy variable of whether respondent received information about the 
unemployment rate of immigrants
Employment rate Dummy variable of whether respondent received information about the 
employment rate of immigrants
Expense Dummy variable of whether respondent received information about the 
expense the unemployment rate of immigrants causes
Income Dummy variable of whether respondent received information about the 
income the employment of immigrants generates
Unemployment rate+expense Dummy variable of whether respondent received information about the 
unemployment rate of immigrants and the expense this may cause
Employment rate+income Dummy variable of whether respondent received information about the 
employment rate of immigrants and the income this may generate
Control variables
Male Gender of respondent (dummy variable, 1 - male, 0 - female)
Age, 18-29 years Age of respondent
Age, 30-59 years Age of respondent
Age, 60+ Age of respondent
Education, primary/no Respondent has completed primary school or no completed education 
(dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 0 -No)
Education, secondary Respondent has completed secondary school  (dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 
0 -No)
Education, tertiary Respondent has completed secondary school  (dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 
0 -No)
Income Respondent's income (1000 NOK)
Regions yes Respondent resides in region,  (dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 0 -No)
Municipal size <10 000 Respondent resides in an area where the population is below 10 000 
inhabitants,  (dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 0 -No)
Municipal size 10 001 - 20 000 Respondent resides in an area where the population is between 10 001 - 
20 000 inhabitants  (dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 0 -No)
Municipal size 20 001 - 60 000 Respondent resides in an area where the population is between 20 001 - 
60 000 inhabitants,  (dummy variable, 1 - Yes, 0 -No)
Municipal sice 60 000+ Respondent resides in an area where the population is above 60 000 




Lastly, I compare the outcome in the treatment groups with the control group by estimating the 
following ordinary least squares equation: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋1𝑋𝑋1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋2𝑋𝑋2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋3𝑋𝑋3𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋4𝑋𝑋4𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋5𝑋𝑋5𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋6𝑋𝑋6𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  (1) 
Where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖, is the outcome variable view on immigration policy for individual 𝑖𝑖, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 are indicator 
variables of which of the treatment group the respondents were exposed to, and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 is a vector of 
the control variables. 
When estimating the heterogenous effects, I include interaction variables between the treatment 
groups and political affiliation, some of the control variables, as well as an interaction between 
the treatments and a variable that measures the respondent’s view on the importance of 
immigration, 
3.5 Data 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the main variables in the sample (see appendix B for 
summary of all variables). The main sample includes 1087 respondents. Because this wave (wave 
seven) of the web-survey did not include a question on income, I had to include an income variable 
from a previous wave (wave 3). Unfortunately, this wave merely included income data for about 
half of the main sample. Therefore, the income variable only includes 591 observations.  
I recoded the dependent variables to values between 0 and 1. The average view in the control and 
treatment groups on benefit/cost of immigration is 0.678, where 0 = great benefit, and 1 = great 
cost. In the sample, people on average characterize immigration as a greater cost than a benefit to 
the Norwegian welfare state. The main dependent variable, attitudes towards immigration policy, 
is also recoded to a value between 0 and 1, where 0 = very mild, and 1 = very strict. The average 
value is 0.705, which signifies that people on average tend towards a stricter view on immigration 
policy.  
Regarding the socio-demographic variables, the mean age is between 30 and 59 years old, around 
30 percent of the people has completed secondary education and 60 percent has completed tertiary 
education, the mean income is around 390 000 NOK a year, and most people live in higher 
populated municipalities such as Akershus, Oslo, and Hordaland. Around 40 percent of the sample 





Table 3. Summary statistics of main variables, full sample 
 
Note: Mean of controls in percentages 
3.6 Randomization and balance 
A total of 1143 random respondents from the Norwegian Citizen panel were selected to 
participate in the experiment. Table 4 shows how many respondents were randomized into each 
group. 
Table 4: Groups  
 
To test if there is balance between all the groups, I perform an orthogonality test. Table 5 presents 
the balance test between the treatments and the control group on all the covariates used in my 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
View on immigration policiy 1,087 0.705 0.186 0.143 1
View on cost of immigration 1,087 0.678 0.203 0.143 1
Male 1,087 0.511 0.500 0 1
Age, 18-29 years 1,087 0.102 0.303 0 1
Age, 30-59 years 1,087 0.552 0.498 0 1
Age, 60+ 1,087 0.346 0.476 0 1
Education, primary/no 1,087 0.098 0.298 0 1
Education, secondary 1,087 0.296 0.457 0 1
Education, tertiary 1,087 0.605 0.489 0 1
Income 591 3.978 1.910 1 8
Municipal size <10 000 1,087 0.179 0.384 0 1
Municipal size 10 001 - 20 000 1,087 0.149 0.357 0 1
Municipal size 20 001 - 60 000 1,087 0.232 0.422 0 1














analysis. If there is balance on the covariates, the respondents are successfully randomized into the 
treatment and control groups. The first seven columns of the table present the mean value of all the 
covariates for each treatment group and the control group. The last column reports a p-value of an 
F-test with the null hypothesis that there are no significant differences between treatment and 
control groups. The F-test shows that the randomization is successful on all covariates except for 
secondary education. From the six first columns we see that the mean value of the covariate on 
secondary education is more spread than the others. The p-value of 0.054 signifies that there are 
significant differences across the control group and treatments with respect to secondary education. 
This means that in some treatments there are more people with secondary education than in other 
treatments, which must be taken into consideration when drawing conclusions.  
However, it is not unlikely that one finds imbalance on one variable, even when assignment to 
treatments is random. The test thus suggests that the randomization has worked well (see appendix 
C for the complete test).    
Table 5. Balance test 
 
 
Control Unemployment Employment Expense Income Unemp+Expense Emp+Income Orthogonality 
Education, primary/no 0.092 0.120 0.096 0.103 0.091 0.120 0.063 0.724
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020)
Education, secondary 0.270 0.247 0.338 0.301 0.358 0.222 0.336 0.054
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.033) (0.040)
Education, tertiary 0.638 0.633 0.567 0.596 0.552 0.658 0.601 0.468
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041)
Age 18-29 0.122 0.111 0.117 0.115 0.074 0.067 0.130 0.341
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Age 30-59 0.561 0.506 0.562 0.474 0.589 0.558 0.527 0.152
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Age 60+ 0.317 0.383 0.321 0.410 0.337 0.374 0.342 0.193
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039)
Gender 0.494 0.525 0.537 0.513 0.514 0.521 0.459 0.907
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041)
Income 4.082 4.036 4.091 3.711 4.010 4.047 3.659 0.066
(0.194) (0.236) (0.227) (0.214) (0.173) (0.198) (0.188)
Municipal size yes
Regions yes




Chapter 4: Results 
 
This chapter presents the main results of the experiment. As discussed, the experiment measures 
the effect of framing on two dependent variables: view on immigration as a benefit or a cost, and 
immigration policy preference. The former measures if the interventions activate beliefs about 
immigration and the latter captures whether framing affects immigration policy preferences.  
The first section presents the findings on the benefit/cost variable, followed by the results on the 
policy preference variable. 
4.1 Benefit or cost of immigration 
Respondents received the following question after the framing (treatments) or after no framing 
(control): 
Question applied in the survey: 
How large would you say the cost or benefit of immigration is to the Norwegian welfare state?  
When comparing the treatment groups to the control group, I find that people update their beliefs 
about their view of immigration as a cost or a benefit to society. Specifcally, I find that negative 
framing has a statistical significant effect, supporting the first hypothesis, 𝐻𝐻1. 
Figure 5 shows the confidence intervals for the control group and the six treatment groups. The y-
axis is a scale that ranges from benefit=0 to cost=1. As already discussed, respondents lean more 
to the cost side of the scale, above 0.5. The figure depicts that respondents are receptive to 
information, and that framing activates the respondents’ beliefs about immigration as a benefit or 
a cost to society. All groups, except for treatment Income and Emp+Income, report that 
immigration is a cost rather than a benefit to society after the framing (not all effects are statistically 
significant). Looking at the point estimates of Employment and Expense it seems that these are are 
statistically different from the control group (they do not overlap the control group’s confidence 
interval). However, since Employment and Control have overlapping confidence intervals, one 
cannot say if they significantly differ before running a regression or performing a t-test of 
differences in means.  The greatest difference appears to lie between the control group and the 




overlapping confidence intervals with Income, and Employment and Expense are therefore 
statistically different from Income.     
Figure 5. View on cost and benefit of immigration by groups 
 
The results in the OLS regression reported in Table 6 confirms that Employment and Expense are 
statistically different from the control group. Model (1) shows a regression of the treatment dummy 
variables on the cost/benefit dependent variable. Those who have been exposed to framing about 
the employment rate state that immigration is a 0.04 (p<0.05) higher cost to society than those in 
the control group. Second, respondents who are exposed to framing about the expense of 
immigration to society state that immigration is a 0.07 (p<0.01) greater cost to society than those 
in the control group. 
Model (2) shows that the effect of the framing persists when I include the control variables gender, 
age, education, municipalities, and size of region. As seen, males state that immigration is a greater 
cost to society than women (p<0.05), younger people state that immigration is a greater benefit to 
society than older people, and people with higher education state that it is more a benefit than 























































of immigration attitudes (see chapter 2). 
Because income reduces the sample size, I only include it in model (3). Interestingly, income 
correlates positively with preferences for stricter immigration policies (p<0.01). This supports the 
fiscal burden hypothesis that natives with high incomes bear the fiscal costs of immigration, and 
therefore prefer stricter immigration policies. The result supports Facchini and Mayda (2009) who 
found that income is positively correlated with stricter immigration policy preferences in countries 
where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants.  
The effect of treatment group Employment vanishes in model (3). I therefore run a regression using 
only the income sample (N=595), with all the control variables, to test if this regression lacks the 
effect of Employment. Model (4) shows the regression without control variables with the reduced 
sample, and model (5) includes controls with the same sample. The lack of effect of the 






















Table 6. Belief benefit/cost of immigration (0=benefit, 1=cost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Benefit/cost Benefit/cost Benefit/cost Benefit/cost Benefit/cost 
      
1.Unemployment 0.0188 0.0137 0.0232 0.0289 0.0243 
 (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.0329) (0.0327) (0.0329) 
2.Employment 0.0435** 0.0446** 0.0365 0.0442 0.0396 
 (0.0216) (0.0212) (0.0306) (0.0313) (0.0308) 
3.Expense 0.0724*** 0.0625*** 0.0969*** 0.110*** 0.0984*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0221) (0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0314) 
4.Income -0.0325 -0.0337 -0.0439 -0.0352 -0.0433 
 (0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0303) (0.0309) (0.0303) 
5.Unemp+Expense 0.0251 0.0256 0.0578* 0.0660** 0.0564* 
 (0.0216) (0.0211) (0.0297) (0.0299) (0.0300) 
6.Emp+Income -0.00749 -0.00497 -0.0125 -0.0122 -0.0150 
 (0.0237) (0.0233) (0.0314) (0.0326) (0.0316) 
Male  0.0245** 0.0168  0.0309* 
  (0.0121) (0.0181)  (0.0168) 
Age 18-29 years  -0.100*** -0.0667**  -0.0882*** 
  (0.0225) (0.0320)  (0.0312) 
Age 30-59  -0.00896 0.0129  0.0179 
  (0.0129) (0.0178)  (0.0177) 
Education, secondary  -0.0219 -0.0406  -0.0392 
  (0.0224) (0.0312)  (0.0307) 
Education, tertiary  -0.0871*** -0.107***  -0.0906*** 
  (0.0210) (0.0294)  (0.0284) 
Income   0.0128**   
 
Regions 
    














            yes 
yes 
Constant 0.661*** 0.724*** 0.661*** 0.647*** 0.700*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0291) (0.0441) (0.0231) (0.0419) 
Observations 1,144 1,093 595 595 595 
R-squared 0.025 0.104 0.147 0.048 0.138 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference categories: Age 60+, Education, 
primary/no, Oslo, and Size of region 60 000+ 
(1) Estimation results, no controls 
(2) Estimation results, controls (without income) 
(3) Estimation results, controls (with income) 
(4) Estimation results, no controls, income sample 












As stated in chapter 3, I treat Employment as negative behavioral framing. Although intended a 
positive frame (employment rate can be viewed as a “success rate”), my results indicate that people 
interpret 60 percent as a low employment rate.  
The results suggest that negative behavioral information and negative impact information activate 
beliefs about immigration, supporting hypothesis 𝐻𝐻1, that negative framing should have a statistic 
significant effect. These interventions seem to update people’s views on the cost of immigration, 
and could possibly activate underlying beliefs. Negative impact framing has a higher statistical 
significance than negative behavioral information, supporting 𝐻𝐻2. I do not find support for 𝐻𝐻3 (their 
combined effects). These interventions seem to update people’s views on the cost of immigration, 
and could possibly activate underlying beliefs about immigration.  
However, experimenter demand effects probably affect the results on this particular dependent 
variable (Zizzo, 2010). Using Zizzo’s (2010) definition, “Experimenter demand effects refer to 
changes in behavior by experimental subjects due to cues about what constitutes appropriate 
behavior” (p.2). It is likely that by informing subjects about the costs and benefits of immigration, 
the experimental design points them in the direction of answering that it is in fact a cost or a benefit. 
A weakness of the dependent variable is therefore that it demands behavior from the subjects.   
4.2 Immigration policy 
The respondents were also asked to answer: 
Question: “How mild or strict should Norway’s immigration policy be?” 
The survey asked individuals to rate their preferences for immigration policy on a scale from mild 
to strict after the framing. Again, I find statistical significance for the treatment Employment. 
Individuals who are exposed to this treatment subsequently rate their preferences for immigration 
policy more strictly. This supports the hypothesis, 𝐻𝐻1, that negative framing is more likely to have 
statistical significance than positive framing. I do not find support for 𝐻𝐻2 or 𝐻𝐻3. 
Figure 6 shows the confidence intervals for view on immigration policy. As seen in the figure, 
point estimates for all groups are above 0.5 signifying that, on average, they prefer stricter rather 
than milder immigration policies. Respondents in all treatment groups prefer stricter immigration 




make it hard to say if any of the effects are statistically different. The respondents in the 
Employment treatment reports the strictest view on immigration policies, which is also statistically 
significant (see regression in table 7).    
Figure 6. View on immigration policy by groups 
 
Table 5 shows the main results of an OLS regression on preference for immigration policy. The 
dependent variable takes a value between 0 and 1, where 0 = very mild, 1 = very strict.  Model (1) 
shows the OLS regression of the interventions. The positive signs of the all the coefficient indicate, 
though not all statistically significant, that all interventions made the respondents rate their 
preferences for immigration policy more strictly than the control. 
I find again that treatment Employment is statistically different from the control group (p<0.1). The 
coefficient expresses that receiving the framing Employment results in respondents rating their 
preferences for immigration policy 0.03 points stricter than the control group. The effect is rather 
small in a scale between 0 and 1, but it is nonetheless statistically significant.  
The effect of Employed persists when I add the control variables (without income) in model (2). I 



























































milder immigration policies than older people (p<0.01), and people with higher education favor 
milder immigration policies than people with no/primary education (p<0.01). These results are 
consistent with studies of the political economy determinants of individual attitudes towards 
immigration discussed in chapter 2. Since these studies use education as a measure for skill level, 
they conclude that the positive correlation between higher education and pro-immigration 
preferences is due to the factors proportions analysis (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001; Mayda, 2006). 
The results on education also support the labor market competition hypothesis, which posits that 
less-skilled natives (lower education) prefer stricter immigration policies.   
Including income in model (3) reduces the sample size. Also here, income correlates positively 
with preferences for stricter immigration policies. As with the previous dependent variable, the 
framing effect of Employment vanishes in model (3) and treatment Expense is statistically 
significant (p<0.05). Again, in model (4) I rerun the regression in the same smaller sample in Model 
(3), and use this sample in running the regression without any controls in model (4). The framing 
effect of Expense persists in model (4) and in model (5), where I include the controls. In these 
model the effect is even stronger (p<0.01), while Employment is statistically insignificant. This 














Table 7. Preference for immigration policy (0=mild, 1=strict) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 










      
1.Unemployment 0.0174 0.0155 0.0164 0.0211 0.0178 
 (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0272) (0.0279) (0.0275) 
2.Employment 0.0362* 0.0332* 0.00631 0.0234 0.0101 
 (0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0275) (0.0284) (0.0282) 
3.Expense 0.0282 0.0174 0.0692** 0.0815*** 0.0710*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0269) (0.0274) (0.0269) 
4.Income 0.0141 0.0105 0.00893 0.0157 0.00958 
 (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0285) (0.0292) (0.0290) 
5.Unemp+Expense 0.0158 0.0140 0.0263 0.0304 0.0243 
 (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0270) (0.0283) (0.0276) 
6.Emp+Income 0.0146 0.0181 0.0125 0.00999 0.00909 
 (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0264) (0.0276) (0.0270) 
Male  0.0525*** 0.0237  0.0418*** 
  (0.0110) (0.0153)  (0.0150) 
Age 18-29 years  -0.0947*** -0.0458  -0.0736*** 
  (0.0214) (0.0283)  (0.0275) 
Age30-59 years  0.00815 0.0178  0.0243 
  (0.0119) (0.0162)  (0.0160) 
Education, secondary  -0.00131 -0.0182  -0.0165 
  (0.0193) (0.0272)  (0.0267) 
Education, tertiary  -0.0717*** -0.0981***  -0.0768*** 
  (0.0185) (0.0272)  (0.0266) 
Income   0.0165***   
 
Regions 










Constant 0.688*** 0.703*** 0.662*** 0.677*** 0.712*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0256) (0.0399) (0.0201) (0.0360) 
Observations 1,138 1,087 591 591 591 
R-squared 0.003 0.103 0.140 0.016 0.121 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference categories: Age 60+, 
Education, primary/no, Oslo, and Size of region 60 000+ 
(1) Estimation results, no controls  
(2) Estimation results, controls (without income)  
(3) Estimation results, controls (with income) 
(4) Estimation results, no controls, income sample 





4.4  Discussion and critique 
The results indicate that providing information that pertains to economic considerations about 
immigration can change what people think about immigration.  
In my first hypothesis, 𝐻𝐻1, I posited that it is more likely to find statistical significance for the 
negative framing than it is to find statistical significance for the positive framing. I found support 
for this hypothesis in both my regressions, and phenomena of loss aversion, “losses loom larger 
than gains,” and a negativity bias may explain the results. Other explanations include the fiscal 
burden hypothesis, that people fear higher taxes or lower benefits, and social identity theory (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1986). In the latter case, by accentuating certain features of immigrants (work 
status/race/origin) in a frame, one reminds respondents of the out-group status of the immigrants. 
This reminder strengthens the in-group mentality, and a negative frame may thus strengthen the 
disfavor of the out-group. 
In 𝐻𝐻2, I asked if it is more likely to find statistical significance for the negative impact framing than 
it is to find statistical significance for the negative behavioral framing. I found that for views on 
the cost/benefit of immigration, both treatments were statistically significant, though negative 
impact framing (p<0.01) more than negative behavioral framing (p<0.05), supporting the 
hypothesis. However, this variable pronounced weaknesses of experimenter demand effects.  
Regarding the second dependent variable, the policy preference variable, I only found that the 
treatment negative behavioral framing was statistically significant, supporting the alternative 
hypothesis that it is more likely to find statistical significance for the negative behavioral framing 
than it is to find statistical significance for the negative impact framing. This is consistent with 
conditional altruism and reciprocity (Fehr & Gachter, 2000), as well as the finding that people are 
less willing to give aid to a recipient the more they perceive him/her as responsible for their 
misfortune (Konow, 2000; List & Cherry, 2008). Another plausible explanation is an anchoring 
effect, where people seem to “anchor” on a number they are shown before answering a question, 
and that this number heavily influences the answers (see Tversky & Kahneman 1975). In this case, 
the frames that provide concrete percentage numbers could lead respondents to “anchor” on these 




Lastly, I hypothesized that, 𝐻𝐻3, it is more likely to find statistical significance for the treatment that 
combines negative behavioral and negative impact information than to find statistical significance 
for the treatment that combines positive behavioral and positive impact information. I found no 
support for this hypothesis.  
There are a number of weaknesses to the experimental design. First, the supposedly positive 
framing, employment, turned out as an even more negative framing than the unemployment frame. 
It appears that the design had two negative behavioral information framing, instead of one positive 
and one negative. Therefore, the experiment cannot surely conclude that it is in fact more likely to 
find statistical significance for the negative framing than the positive framing, since I do not have 
a “proper” positive behavioral frame. 
Second, the experiment merely includes self-reported measures and not behavioral measures of 
change in views of the cost/benefit of immigration and policy preferences. It is therefore impossible 
to tell if respondents would act upon these changes.  Grigorieff et al. (2016) finds that respondents 
update their views about immigration when learning the actual share of immigrants in their country, 
and through a behavioral measure, they find that people consequently donate more money to a pro-
immigrant charity.   
Furthermore, I do not test whether the effect persist over time through a follow up question. Most 
likely, I would not find an effect in a follow up since the effect were rather small. Ellingsen et al. 
(2012) argue that social frames may enter people’s beliefs rather than their preferences, and that 
people are more likely to be cooperative in a Prisoner’s dilemma experiment when it is called the 
“Community game” than when it is called the “Stock market game.” This effect, however,  vanishes 
when the game is played sequentially, suggesting that the frame merely activated a short-term 
belief and not a preference.   
The experiment had few observations and many treatment groups. With more observations in each 
interventions, it would be more likely to achieve statistic significant results. More observations 
could also strengthen the goodness of fit of the model.  
Lastly, it is difficult to say whether the framing affects views, beliefs, attitudes or preferences 
towards immigration. The first dependent variable measured views of cost/benefit and in my design 




dependent variable measured immigration policy preferences, and in my design it captured 
underlying preferences for immigration. On the one hand, the thesis cannot conclude which effect 
or mechanism is at play. On the other, it can argue that by providing certain types of negative 
information about immigration, people update their views about immigration, at least in the very 
short-run, although it may only be situation-dependent. This supports Grigorieff et al (2016) who 
conclude, “While providing information can change how people perceive immigrants, it might not 























Chapter 5: Heterogeneous effects 
 
Lastly, are some people more affected by framing than others?  It is likely that factors such as 
education, gender, and age, political affiliation, as well as personal involvement in an issue help 
decide whom the framing manipulations affect. For instance, is the impact of the framing greater 
for people with high or low education, for young or old, male or female? Are right wing or left 
wing voters more likely to be affected by the framing? Lastly, are people who view immigration 
as important less likely to be affected by the framing manipulations? These questions are important 
for targeting various types of information towards specific types of people.  
This chapter answers these questions by testing heterogeneous or interaction effects. I test for 
effects between the treatment variables and the control variables, the treatments and political 
affiliation variables, and lastly between the treatments and a variable that captures respondent view 
on the importance of immigration politics. I test these interaction effects on the dependent variable 
that measures preferences for immigration policies. 
It is likely that the heterogeneous effects work through some of the economic and socio-
psychological mechanisms discussed in chapter 2. Since I only include ‘economic’ variables, the 
thesis can only find support for some of the economic determinants of attitudes. Lastly, the thesis 
merely discusses the potential mechanisms in play, since it is likely that many other factors (such 
as socio-psychological) also affect attitudes.   
5.1 Control variables 
The results in chapter 4 suggest that younger people, women, and highly educated natives prefer 
milder immigration policies than older people, males and the less educated natives. These results, 
however, do not say whom the framing affects.  
Is it likely that highly educated natives are more receptive to information and thus affected by the 
framing, or are they more critical to the information? Does framing have different effects across 
gender? Lastly, are some age groups more affected by the framing manipulations than others? 
Facchini et al. (2016) find that the framing effect is mostly driven by the exposure of people to new 
information, rather than resulting from framing certain issues. Based on this, they argue that the 




people are less exposed to information than younger people, for example through using social 
media, is it likely that older people are more affected by framing than younger people are?  
To test this, I run the regression with the main control variables (except income) and include the 
interaction effects with the dummy variables age 60+, higher education, income and gender. I 
include dummy variables to make the analysis simpler. In this analysis, age 60+ is a dummy which 
takes the value 1 if respondents are older than 60 and 0 if younger than 60. Similarly, higher 
education takes the value 1 if respondents are highly educated, and 0 if they have secondary, 
primary/no education. Income takes the value 1 if respondents earn between 700 000- 1 000 000 
NOK, and 0 if less. Gender takes value 1 if male, 0 if female. Table 8 shows the results from the 
OLS estimation. The first row shows the dependent variable, policy preference, which measures 
preferences for immigration policy, where 0=mild and 1=strict. The second row shows the 
interaction variables.  
In model (1), where the interaction is age 60+, the main effect is given by 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖, and shows the 
treatment effect on the young. Its level of significance indicates whether it is statistically different 
from zero (it is not for any of the interventions). The interaction effect is given by 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, and 
shows the difference between the treatment effects of the old versus the young for each of the 
interventions. The interaction effect is 0 for the young (scoring 0 on the age dummy). The 
significance level indicates whether the two groups are affected differently by the treatment. The 
sum of the main effect and the interaction effect is the treatment effect on the old, and its level of 
significance given below in the table for all interventions indicates whether it is statistically 
different from zero. The two effects give the overall effect of the interaction for the old.  
P-values at the bottom of the tables reflect a test of whether the sum of the treatment effects and 
their interaction is significant. The effect of this test may be statistically significant (p<0.1), even 
though the main effect and interaction effect are not separately statistically significant. This is 
because the p-value tests the hypothesis that the sum of the main effect and the interaction effects 
equal to zero.  
Model (1) shows the interaction effect between the treatments and people aged above 60 years, 
model (2) with higher educated people, model (3) with people with high income, and model (4) 




The effects of treatment Employment on age group 60+ is the main effect (effect on the young) 
0.017 + the interaction effect of 0.059 = 0.076 (with a p-value of 0.0024 given below table). This 
suggests that people in age group 60+ prefer stricter immigration policies after the treatment 
Employment. On a scale between 0 and 1 (which was originally 1-7), a 0.14 change on the new 
scale means moving one answer on the original scale. This means that the treatment Employment 
affects the age group 60+ by a little more than halfway to the next answer on the scale.  
Interestingly, I find that almost all framing effects affect people above 60 years (p-values given 
below the table are all statistically significant except for EmpIncome with a p=0.12). All (added) 
effects are positive, meaning that the framing effects make natives above 60 years rate their 
preference for immigration policy more strictly.  
Further, I find that Employment also effects those with higher education. Intriguingly, highly 
educated natives become stricter in their views on immigration policies when they learn that the 
employment rate is 60 percent. The added effect is 0.07, meaning that they move halfway towards 
the next answer on the original scale. This supports the reasoning that people interpret 60 percent 
as a low employment rate and that this framing is probably even more negative than the initial 
negative framing (unemployment rate).  
The p-value showing that the sum of the treatment effects and their interaction is significant, is 
close to statistically significant for the Expense with those with higher income. This supports the 
previous finding that the effect of Expense is in the income sample, since those with higher income 
are affected by this framing.  











Table 8. Interaction effects: control variables  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)











1. Unemployment -0.001   -0.004   0.033   0.019   
(0.025)   (0.033)   (0.031)   (0.029)   
Unemployment*Interaction variable 0.060   0.035   -0.016   -0.002   
(0.042)   (0.042)   (0.088)   (0.040)   
2. Employment 0.017   -0.008   -0.005   0.045   
(0.024)   (0.030)   (0.030)   (0.029)   
Employment*Interaction variable 0.059   0.074*  0.036   -0.018   
(0.042)   (0.040)   (0.078)   (0.040)   
3. Expense 0.002   -0.005   0.089*** 0.022   
(0.028)   (0.029)   (0.029)   (0.030)   
Expense*Interaction variable 0.053   0.037   -0.246** -0.007   
(0.042)   (0.041)   (0.100)   (0.042)   
4. Income -0.003   -0.006   0.029   0.030   
(0.026)   (0.028)   (0.030)   (0.029)   
Income*Interaction variable 0.062   0.036   -0.060   -0.026   
(0.042)   (0.040)   (0.093)   (0.041)   
5. Unempexpense -0.007   0.003   0.036   0.031   
(0.024)   (0.031)   (0.029)   (0.029)   
Unempexpense*Interaction variable 0.080*  0.026   0.037   -0.023   
(0.042)   (0.040)   (0.083) (0.040)   
6. Empincome 0.003   -0.008   0.016   0.017   
(0.025)   (0.028)   (0.027)   (0.028)   
Empincome*Interaction variable 0.050   0.042   0.030   0.002   
(0.042)   (0.040)   (0.131)   (0.040)   
Age 60+ -0.044   0.008   -0.001   0.008   
(0.030)   (0.011)   (0.015)   (0.012)   
Education, tertiary -0.059*** -0.094*** -0.063*** -0.058***
(0.012)   (0.027)   (0.016)   (0.012)   
High income 0.095   
(0.070)   
Gender 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.034** 0.068** 
(0.011) (0.011)  (0.015)   (0.028)  
Constant 0.695*** 0.703*** 0.679*** 0.674***
(0.023)   (0.025)   (0.030)   (0.025)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.082   0.081   0.131   0.079   
N 1087 1087 566 1087
p-value 0.078   0.219   0.832   0.536   
p-value 0.024   0.014   0.666   0.345   
p-value 0.086   0.264   0.105   0.612   
p-value 0.075   0.282   0.715   0.882   
p-value 0.036   0.265   0.351   0.776   













(𝛽𝛽𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥2𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥3 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥3𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥4 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥4𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥5 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥5𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)




5.2 Political affiliation 
Are people on the right or left of the political scale more affected by the framing effects? Is it likely 
that people who vote extreme parties are less affected by framing because they already lie in the 
extreme right or left of the scale (prefer either very mild or very strict immigration policies). On 
the other hand, they could also be more prone to the framing because they have strong beliefs about 
the matter and the framing makes these beliefs even stronger. 
I present the main results from the interaction effects between the treatments and political party 
affiliation. I find no results for people who belong to the two main parties in Norway, Høyre and 
Arbeiderpartiet and therefore I do not include them in the table. Model (5), (6), and (7) shows the 
results on the parties Rødt, Senterpartiet (Sp) and Frp. Rødt have fairly anti-restrictionist policy 
views, Sp have fairly restrictionist policy views, and Frp have the most restrictionist policy views.  
I find that the framing in treatment Employment affects both Rødt and Sp supporters (p-values 
below 0.1). Rødt voters move one whole answer towards milder policies on the scale. Sp voters 
who receive the same framing subsequently prefer stricter policies.  
On the other hand, only 3 percent of the sample votes Rødt and 5 percent votes Sp. This means that 
in the sample, each group has around three to ten voters from Rødt and Sp, and the representation 
may not be large enough to dedicate the effect of framing to party affiliation. In addition, since I 
do not find results for the major parties Arbeiderpartiet and Høyre, this suggests that other factors 
than political affiliation determine whom the framing effects affect.    
Regarding FrP, I find statistical significance for Unemployment and Income. The results show that 












Table 9. Interaction effects: Political affiliation 
 
Note: Ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls 
include age, gender, education, regions, and size of municipality. Reference categories: Age 60+, Education, primary/no, Oslo, 
and Size of region 60 000+. Reference category political affiliation: those who did not vote. 
     (5) Estimation results, interaction Rødt 
     (6) Estimation results, interaction SP 
     (7) Estimation results, interaction FrP 
(5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable Policy preference Policy preference Policy preference
Interaction variable Rødt SP FRP
1. Unemployment 0.012   0.014   -0.000   
(0.020)   (0.021)   (0.020)   
Unemployment*Interaction variable 0.031   0.010   0.074*  
(0.229)   (0.076)   (0.045)   
2. Employment 0.034*  0.025   0.028   
(0.020)   (0.021)   (0.020)   
Employment*Interaction variable -0.168** 0.129** 0.014   
(0.081)   (0.060)   (0.068)   
3. Expense 0.024   0.012   0.003   
(0.021)   (0.022)   (0.022)   
Expense*Interaction variable -0.158*  0.101   0.036   
(0.087)   (0.083)   (0.043)   
4. Income 0.006   0.003   -0.005   
(0.021)   (0.021)   (0.021)   
Income*Interaction variable 0.069   0.106   0.090** 
(0.133)   (0.072)   (0.045)   
5. Unempexpense 0.009   0.014   0.007   
(0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020)   
Unempexpense*Interaction variable 0.104   -0.010   -0.026   
(0.078)   (0.078)   (0.054)   
6. Empincome 0.020   0.013   -0.010   
(0.020)   (0.021)   (0.020)   
Empincome*Interaction variable -0.017   0.057   0.092** 
(0.097)   (0.075)   (0.044)   
Rødt -0.130*  
(0.071)   
SP -0.053   
(0.048)   
FrP 0.153***
(0.034)   
Constant 0.714*** 0.710*** 0.688***
(0.026)   (0.026)   (0.025)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes
r2 0.127   0.105   0.200   
N 1082 1082 1082
p-value 0.853   0.751   0.062   
p-value 0.089   0.007   0.516   
p-value 0.113   0.158   0.291   
p-value 0.568   0.112   0.034   
p-value 0.131   0.956   0.718   













(𝛽𝛽𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥2 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥3 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥4 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥4 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥5 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥5 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)




5.3 Importance of immigration 
Is it likely that those who view immigration politics as important are less susceptible to the framing 
manipulations? According to Levin et al. (1998), “topics involving issues of strongly held attitudes 
or high personal involvement are less susceptible to attribute framing effects.” (p.160). For 
instance, Marteau (1989) found no effects of framing abortion decisions, concluding that the topic 
involves strongly held attitudes. Others have argued that voters who consider immigration as 
important give more thought to immigration and will therefore be more affected by the frames 
(Knoll et al, 2011).  
I test this by using a variable that asks respondents: How important is immigration policy to you? 
They answer either 1= very important, 2= important, 3=somewhat important, 4=slightly important, 
and 5=not important at all. I recode the variable to a dummy, taking the value 1 if respondents think 
immigration is very important, important, and somewhat important. It takes the value 0 if they find 
it slightly important or not important at all. Table 8 presents the interaction between the dummy 
variable measuring the importance of immigration policies and the treatment groups. 
I find that those who view immigration policies as important are affected by framing about the 
employment rate of immigrants (60 percent). The added effect (0.037) shows that the respondents 
who view immigration policy as important prefer stricter policies when they receive information 
that the employment rate is 60 percent.  
This result is in opposition to Levin et al. (1998) hypothesis and Marteau’s (1989) findings, that 
issues of strongly held attitudes are less susceptible to attribute framing effects.8 On the other hand, 
with respect to Marteau’s (1989) study, abortion may be a topic involving a more strongly held 
attitudes than those of immigration policies.  
                                                          




Table 10. Interaction effects: Importance of immigration policies 
 
(8)




1. Unemployment -0.075   
(0.067)   
Unemployment*Interaction variable 0.100   
(0.070)   
2. Employment 0.000   
(0.065)   
Employment*Interaction variable 0.037   
(0.068)   
3. Expense -0.058   
(0.067)   
Expense*Interaction variable 0.086   
(0.071)   
4. Income -0.009   
(0.068)   
Income*Interaction variable 0.027   
(0.071)   
5. Unempexpense 0.006   
(0.062)   
Unempexpense*Interaction variable 0.011   
(0.066)   
6. Empincome 0.006   
(0.063)   
Empincome*Interaction variable 0.011   
(0.067)   
Immigration important -0.037   
(0.056)   
Constant 0.716***
(0.056)   
Controls Yes
r2 0.081   
N 1087
p-value 0.231   
p-value 0.073   
p-value 0.216   
p-value 0.406   
p-value 0.449   













(𝛽𝛽𝑥1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥2 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥3 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥3 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥4 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥4 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)
(𝛽𝛽𝑥5 + 𝛽𝛽𝑥5 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 0)




Chapter 6: Concluding remarks 
 
In light of the international refugee crisis and the increasing applications for asylum to Norway, 
this thesis has shed light on an important aspect of the immigration debate: the determinants of 
individual attitudes towards immigration, as well as how various types of information can affect 
these attitudes.  
The thesis has showed that providing various types of negative and positive information about 
immigration may affect attitudes towards immigration. People are susceptible to negative framing 
emphasizing the costs of immigration, and specifically, behavioral information about the 
employment rate of immigrants in Norway, which is 60 percent, causes individuals to rate their 
preferences for immigration policy more strictly. This suggests that people react negatively to a 
seemingly low employment rate of immigrants.  
While there are probably many factors that explain individual attitudes towards immigration, this 
thesis has attempted to activate the economic determinants and mechanisms. The results of the 
negative framing lends support to the notion that “losses loom larger than gains,” or loss aversion. 
In the words of prospect theory, people are more willing to forego the benefits of immigration than 
to bear the costs of it. There are however many other possible mechanisms, including the fiscal 
burden hypothesis or an anchoring effect. Further, conditional altruism and reciprocity may also 
explain why information about a seemingly low employment rate affects attitudes. Dependent on 
the behavior of immigrants, the conditional altruist will shape his or her attitudes towards them.   
Lastly, my results implicate that various types of information may influence how people perceive 
immigration, and are accordingly important for policy outcomes and integration. The results show 
that the experimental design activates certain beliefs and preferences for immigration policy, and 
that framing causes a short-term change in preferences for immigration policy. However, the exact 
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Appendix B: Summary statistics, all variables 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
View on immigration policiy 1,087 0.705 0.186 0.143 1
View on cost of immigration 1,087 0.678 0.203 0.143 1
Main controls
Male 1,087 0.511 0.500 0 1
Age, 18-29 years 1,087 0.102 0.303 0 1
Age, 30-59 years 1,087 0.552 0.498 0 1
Age, 60+ 1,087 0.346 0.476 0 1
Education, primary/no 1,087 0.098 0.298 0 1
Education, secondary 1,087 0.296 0.457 0 1
Education, tertiary 1,087 0.605 0.489 0 1
Income 591 3.978 1.910 1 8
Political parties
Kristelig Folkeparti 1,132 0.042 0.202 0 1
Høyre 1,132 0.227 0.419 0 1
Fremskrittspartiet 1,132 0.102 0.302 0 1
Venste 1,132 0.051 0.220 0 1
Sosialistisk Venstreparti 1,132 0.061 0.239 0 1
Senterpartiet 1,132 0.051 0.218 0 1
Miljøpartiet De Grønne 1,132 0.035 0.184 0 1
Arbeiderpartiet 1,132 0.314 0.464 0 1
Rødt 1,132 0.029 0.168 0 1
Immigration politics important 1,138 0.707 0.174 .2 1
Regions
Akershus 1,087 0.121 0.327 0 1
Oslo 1,087 0.157 0.364 0 1
Østfold 1,087 0.057 0.232 0 1
Vestfold 1,087 0.052 0.223 0 1
Hedmark 1,087 0.029 0.167 0 1
Oppland 1,087 0.024 0.156 0 1
Buskerud 1,087 0.056 0.230 0 1
Telemark 1,087 0.033 0.179 0 1
Vest-Agder 1,087 0.035 0.184 0 1
Aust-Agder 1,087 0.013 0.113 0 1
Rogaland 1,087 0.086 0.280 0 1
Hordaland 1,087 0.108 0.310 0 1
Sogn og Fjorande 1,087 0.014 0.117 0 1
Møre og Romsdal 1,087 0.044 0.206 0 1
Sør-Trøndelag 1,087 0.067 0.250 0 1
Nord-Trøndelag 1,087 0.022 0.147 0 1
Nordland 1,087 0.043 0.203 0 1
Troms 1,087 0.029 0.167 0 1
Finnmark 1,087 0.009 0.096 0 1
Municipal size
Municipal size <10 000 1,087 0.179 0.384 0 1
Municipal size 10 001 - 20 000 1,087 0.149 0.357 0 1
Municipal size 20 001 - 60 000 1,087 0.232 0.422 0 1




Appendix C: Complete balance test 
 
Control Unemployment Employment Expense Income Unemp+Expense Emp+Income Orthogonality test
Education, primary/no 0.092 0.120 0.096 0.103 0.091 0.120 0.063 0.724
(0.022) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020)
Education, secondary 0.270 0.247 0.338 0.301 0.358 0.222 0.336 0.054
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.033) (0.040)
Education, tertiary 0.638 0.633 0.567 0.596 0.552 0.658 0.601 0.468
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041)
Age 18-29 0.122 0.111 0.117 0.115 0.074 0.067 0.130 0.341
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Age 30-59 0.561 0.506 0.562 0.474 0.589 0.558 0.527 0.152
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Age 60+ 0.317 0.383 0.321 0.410 0.337 0.374 0.342 0.193
(0.035) (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.039)
Gender 0.494 0.525 0.537 0.513 0.514 0.521 0.459 0.907
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041)
Income 4.082 4.036 4.091 3.711 4.010 4.047 3.659 0.066
(0.194) (0.236) (0.227) (0.214) (0.173) (0.198) (0.188)
Akershus 0.111 0.142 0.136 0.109 0.103 0.135 0.103 0.877
(0.023) 0.028 0.027 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.025
Oslo 0.200 0.160 0.173 0.103 0.131 0.141 0.178 0.205
(0.030) 0.029 0.030 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.032
Østfold 0.050 0.074 0.031 0.077 0.029 0.080 0.062 0.183
(0.016) 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.013 0.021 0.020
Vestfold 0.039 0.043 0.049 0.077 0.029 0.055 0.096 0.258
(0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.013) (0.018) (0.024)
Hedmark 0.028 0.012 0.019 0.019 0.040 0.037 0.041 0.536
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Oppland 0.033 0.019 0.037 0.032 0.006 0.018 0.034 0.015
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.006) (0.011) (0.015)
Buskerud 0.050 0.056 0.049 0.071 0.057 0.037 0.075 0.860
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022)
Telemark 0.044 0.037 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.037 0.014 0.740
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.010)
Vest-Agder 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.071 0.040 0.018 0.014 0.233
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010)
Aust-Agder 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.000 0.023 0.018 0.014 0.000
(0.000) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Rogaland 0.100 0.062 0.080 0.090 0.097 0.098 0.068 0.839
(0.022) (0.019) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021)
Hordaland 0.083 0.130 0.117 0.103 0.143 0.080 0.103 0.343
(0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) 0.021) (0.025)
Sogn og Fjorande 0.006 0.012 0.019 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.007 0.392
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007)
Møre og Romsdal 0.056 0.056 0.043 0.019 0.034 0.055 0.048 0.507
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Sør-Trøndelag 0.050 0.074 0.056 0.051 0.074 0.086 0.082 0.729
(0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023)
Nord-Trøndelag 0.011 0.019 0.019 0.045 0.040 0.006 0.007 0.098
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.006) (0.007)
Nordland 0.044 0.031 0.056 0.038 0.074 0.037 0.027 0.617
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014)
Troms 0.028 0.012 0.025 0.058 0.023 0.031 0.027 0.602
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Finnmark 0.028 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.000
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.009) (0.000)
Municipal Size < 10 00 0.167 0.198 0.185 0.199 0.177 0.196 0.151 0.919
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Municipal Size 10 001 -  0.117 0.142 0.160 0.192 0.166 0.135 0.144 0.670
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029)
Municipal Size 20 001 -  0.222 0.216 0.216 0.212 0.240 0.252 0.267 0.395
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.037)
Municipal Size 20 001 -  0.222 0.216 0.216 0.212 0.240 0.252 0.267 0.395
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.037)

















p-value    
(control vs 
unemp+expense)
p-value   
(control vs 
emp+income)
Education, primary/no 0.417 0.911 0.747 0.973 0.406 0.334
Education, secondary 0.632 0.184 0.540 0.084 0.305 0.209
Education, tertiary 0.932 0.189 0.443 0.106 0.700 0.507
Age 18-29 0.750 0.889 0.847 0.129 0.082 0.831
Age 30-59 0.311 0.991 0.113 0.602 0.958 0.545
Age 60+ 0.203 0.932 0.076 0.682 0.265 0.624
Gender 0.578 0.433 0.738 0.709 0.618 0.524
Income 0.881 0.975 0.201 0.784 0.900 0.119
Akershus 0.394 0.491 0.950 0.802 0.504 0.808
Oslo 0.343 0.520 0.012 0.082 0.147 0.616
Østfold 0.361 0.368 0.318 0.299 0.268 0.652
Vestfold 0.841 0.639 0.142 0.591 0.479 0.046
Hedmark 0.306 0.569 0.605 0.526 0.639 0.518
Oppland 0.387 0.853 0.948 0.059 0.383 0.964
Buskerud 0.819 0.979 0.435 0.766 0.549 0.354
Telemark 0.730 0.510 0.347 0.624 0.721 0.092
Vest-Agder 0.929 0.929 0.209 0.957 0.253 0.148
Aust-Agder 0.082 0.082 . 0.044 0.082 0.157
Rogaland 0.193 0.524 0.749 0.928 0.955 0.306
Hordaland 0.169 0.300 0.548 0.078 0.904 0.552
Sogn og Fjorande 0.511 0.280 0.494 0.306 0.282 0.883
Møre og Romsdal 1.000 0.599 0.075 0.334 0.989 0.758
Sør-Trøndelag 0.361 0.819 0.958 0.345 0.191 0.252
Nord-Trøndelag 0.575 0.575 0.067 0.086 0.617 0.682
Nordland 0.510 0.640 0.784 0.236 0.721 0.407
Troms 0.306 0.859 0.183 0.769 0.874 0.983
Finnmark 0.117 0.117 0.024 0.104 0.303 0.024
Municipal Size < 10 000 0.462 0.655 0.451 0.794 0.479 0.695
Municipal Size 10 001 - 20 000 0.489 0.244 0.058 0.186 0.612 0.472
Municipal Size 20 001 - 60 000 0.891 0.891 0.813 0.692 0.526 0.351




















Education, primary/no 0.492 0.638 0.404 0.995 0.090
Education, secondary 0.080 0.293 0.032 0.604 0.095
Education, tertiary 0.236 0.510 0.141 0.649 0.576
Age 18-29 0.862 0.905 0.247 0.169 0.611
Age 30-59 0.318 0.572 0.130 0.348 0.711
Age 60+ 0.246 0.617 0.386 0.875 0.464
Gender 0.824 0.833 0.849 0.954 0.250
Income 0.866 0.309 0.931 0.972 0.213
Akershus 0.873 0.376 0.276 0.855 0.294
Oslo 0.766 0.127 0.452 0.627 0.683
Østfold 0.082 0.924 0.061 0.848 0.665
Vestfold 0.792 0.208 0.474 0.618 0.073
Hedmark 0.653 0.624 0.109 0.155 0.124
Oppland 0.312 0.445 0.289 0.994 0.395
Buskerud 0.804 0.585 0.950 0.422 0.486
Telemark 0.760 0.561 0.892 0.991 0.189
Vest-Agder 1.000 0.188 0.888 0.308 0.189
Aust-Agder 1.000 0.082 0.780 0.994 0.737
Rogaland 0.518 0.348 0.229 0.227 0.811
Hordaland 0.737 0.452 0.724 0.143 0.463
Sogn og Fjorande 0.653 0.970 0.715 0.658 0.620
Møre og Romsdal 0.609 0.087 0.350 0.989 0.764
Sør-Trøndelag 0.500 0.403 0.994 0.696 0.792
Nord-Trøndelag 1.000 0.183 0.240 0.314 0.357
Nordland 0.276 0.713 0.073 0.768 0.857
Troms 0.411 0.029 0.462 0.256 0.351
Finnmark 1.000 0.318 0.957 0.567 0.318
Municipal Size < 10 000 0.778 0.979 0.633 0.978 0.279
Municipal Size 10 001 - 20 000 0.643 0.231 0.547 0.855 0.963
Municipal Size 20 001 - 60 000 1.000 0.922 0.602 0.451 0.298

















Education, primary/no 0.835 0.887 0.481 0.296
Education, secondary 0.501 0.707 0.022 0.972
Education, tertiary 0.610 0.782 0.097 0.546
Age 18-29 0.958 0.183 0.122 0.734
Age 30-59 0.120 0.620 0.950 0.547
Age 60+ 0.099 0.753 0.315 0.691
Gender 0.667 0.677 0.779 0.172
Income 0.224 0.778 0.883 0.144
Akershus 0.467 0.354 0.983 0.371
Oslo 0.069 0.293 0.433 0.904
Østfold 0.070 0.902 0.054 0.204
Vestfold 0.315 0.328 0.814 0.120
Hedmark 0.963 0.240 0.316 0.251
Oppland 0.808 0.050 0.308 0.895
Buskerud 0.430 0.752 0.578 0.351
Telemark 0.779 0.860 0.768 0.305
Vest-Agder 0.188 0.888 0.308 0.189
Aust-Agder 0.082 0.780 0.994 0.737
Rogaland 0.762 0.586 0.572 0.695
Hordaland 0.676 0.486 0.258 0.684
Sogn og Fjorande 0.683 0.924 0.994 0.357
Møre og Romsdal 0.219 0.673 0.618 0.843
Sør-Trøndelag 0.866 0.486 0.287 0.361
Nord-Trøndelag 0.183 0.240 0.314 0.357
Nordland 0.472 0.486 0.422 0.213
Troms 0.141 0.912 0.743 0.882
Finnmark 0.318 0.957 0.567 0.318
Municipal Size < 10 000 0.760 0.849 0.799 0.419
Municipal Size 10 001 - 20 000 0.459 0.897 0.518 0.685
Municipal Size 20 001 - 60 000 0.922 0.602 0.451 0.298

















p-value               
(expense vs 
income)















Education, primary/no 0.726 0.629 0.221 0.393 0.357 0.083
Education, secondary 0.293 0.115 0.533 0.007 0.688 0.028
Education, tertiary 0.431 0.263 0.924 0.050 0.378 0.310
Age 18-29 0.206 0.140 0.698 0.808 0.104 0.068
Age 30-59 0.038 0.135 0.359 0.575 0.274 0.588
Age 60+ 0.171 0.512 0.225 0.478 0.920 0.562
Gender 0.979 0.878 0.350 0.895 0.324 0.273
Income 0.278 0.252 0.856 0.890 0.170 0.157
Akershus 0.857 0.479 0.861 0.365 0.997 0.382
Oslo 0.415 0.294 0.060 0.796 0.254 0.378
Østfold 0.053 0.925 0.602 0.039 0.163 0.535
Vestfold 0.053 0.438 0.560 0.226 0.015 0.181
Hedmark 0.263 0.342 0.271 0.879 0.961 0.847
Oppland 0.085 0.440 0.916 0.291 0.078 0.391
Buskerud 0.622 0.184 0.872 0.377 0.518 0.146
Telemark 0.645 0.567 0.455 0.901 0.222 0.192
Vest-Agder 0.230 0.025 0.013 0.237 0.139 0.742
Aust-Agder 0.044 0.082 0.157 0.774 0.539 0.742
Rogaland 0.818 0.797 0.495 0.975 0.352 0.346
Hordaland 0.264 0.481 0.996 0.064 0.274 0.487
Sogn og Fjorande 0.746 0.688 0.599 0.930 0.391 0.359
Møre og Romsdal 0.395 0.089 0.170 0.356 0.544 0.773
Sør-Trøndelag 0.388 0.222 0.285 0.696 0.794 0.907
Nord-Trøndelag 0.827 0.030 0.035 0.036 0.044 0.938
Nordland 0.156 0.938 0.591 0.131 0.052 0.639
Troms 0.112 0.243 0.191 0.658 0.797 0.864
Finnmark 0.318 0.157 0.528 0.318 0.157
Municipal Size < 10 000 0.618 0.957 0.273 0.653 0.524 0.290
Municipal Size 10 001 - 20 000 0.531 0.168 0.261 0.430 0.590 0.823
Municipal Size 20 001 - 60 000 0.537 0.399 0.260 0.806 0.580 0.756
Municipal Size 20 001 - 60 000 0.537 0.399 0.260 0.806 0.580 0.756
